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Ireland: from racism without ‘race’, to ‘racism without racists’ 
 
While the Irish have been relentlessly racialized in their diaspora settings, little if any 
historical work engages with ‘race’ to understand Irish history on the island of Ireland (1). 
While ‘race’ was a mainstream prism through which to understand history for social 
scientists from the first decades of the nineteenth century, there is minimal engagement 
with it from historians of Ireland, other than to downplay the negative assertions of 
Anglo-Saxon historiography. (2) Interest in ‘race’ has come principally from the social 
sciences, and following McVeigh’s pioneering analysis, a small corpus has begun to 
develop. (3) I want to argue, from the perspective of a sociologist interested in the 
history of the idea of ‘race’, that this is a colossal disciplinary gap: that Ireland itself 
occupies a keystone position in the development of ‘race’ and the process of 
racialization. Contrary to the main body of work that pinpoints the Enlightenment 
and/or the New World as the crucibles of racism, I assert that Ireland was the colonial 
setting for proto-racism, or, to twist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva’s formulation (4), racism 
without ‘race’. I argue that the colonization and settlement of Ireland by the English, and 
later Scots settlers, constitutes the birth of ‘race’ as a political category that inscribes 
inequality on the bodies and cultures of the actors. This occurs in the context of the 
semi-privatized theft of land from indigenous people by the colonizers, a precursor of 
the New World and Australasian contexts. Moreover, in a paradoxical historical circle, 
contemporary Ireland has become home to ‘racism without racists’– an economic and 
social space organized by neo-liberal principles of governance and the movement of 
capital and labor, whose results are to racialize immigrants and Irish nationals alike, 
regardless of whether or not they are ostensibly ‘white’. So this is a  journey from a 
situation in which culture represents all difference, as  bodies are so similar, to one where 
culture is a proxy for physical bodies that are ‘raced’ and different. The intention is to 
provide an overarching framework for understanding the significance of ‘race’ in Irish 
history, or indeed, as I shall argue, the significance of Ireland for the history of ‘race’. I 
will first define what I mean by ‘race’ and racialization, before examining the colonial 
period of Irish history. 
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I Race and Racialisation 
 
The concept of racialization has emerged from sociological work on racism and is based 
on the idea that the object of study should not be “race” itself, but rather, the processes 
by which “race” becomes salient. I will give a very brief background to this before 
making a case that historians might find this concept (which relies explicitly on the 
historicization of social relations, whether at a collective or personal level (5)) appropriate 
and useful. Particularly since the 1940s in the USA, and the late 1950s in the UK (6), and 
well into the 1980s in both cases, social science methodological approaches to the subject 
have followed a “race relations” model, a framework which assumes the existence of 
‘races’ and aims to understand their relations (7). This has the result of reifying ‘race’, 
which we now interpret as being injected with social meanings that differ from one place 
to another and one period to another, i.e. a social construction that has real material and 
cultural implications. So instead of treating ‘race’ as part of the puzzle to be 
comprehended, ‘race relations’ is a reductive public policy paradigm that makes a number 
of assumptions about people’s identities, including the idea that their racial identity is 
always the most important social identification.  
Critiquing such conceptualizations of race, Michael Omi explains that the meaning of 
race ‘has been and probably always will be fluid and subject to multiple determinations. 
Race cannot be seen simply as an objective fact, nor treated as an independent variable.’ 
(8) Analyses that place the question of race at their heart should therefore take into 
account ‘how groups not previously defined as ‘races’ have come to be defined in this 
way and assess the various factors involved in such processes’. (9) Focusing on the 
process per se is significant, according to postcolonial scholar Patrick Wolfe, since 
‘racialisation is an exercise of power in its own right, as opposed to a commentary that 
enables or facilitates a prior exercise of power.’ (10) At times then, racialization can be an 
intentional endeavor, a series of acts done to others as part of an unequal power 
relationship. Very obvious ‘racial projects’ to use Omi and Winant’s term (11), such as 
apartheid, Jim Crow, or the Final Solution lie at one end of the spectrum of this form of 
relationship. Indeed, this take on racialization can be traced back to Fanon’s use of the 
term as a synonym of dehumanization, drawn from his experiences of French colonial 
North Africa (12). However, it is important also to consider that racialization can also be 
a normal consequence of institutional operations, an intrinsic feature of the modern 
State’s functions of classification, biopolitics, and governance (13). In both cases, ‘race’ is 
 3
a salient factor in the way social resources end up getting allocated, even if this is not the 
stated objective (as it was in the three instances listed above). Carmichael and Hamilton’s 
well-known distinction between institutional racism (disproportionately impoverishing 
and effectively killing black children) and individual racism (the 1963 bombing of 16th 
Street Baptist Church in Birmingham, AL) indicates how the resource-allocation process 
results in racially distinctive patterns due to the historical over-representation of black 
Americans in the working class (14).  
Finally, I would suggest that racialization can be a voluntary communal enterprise or 
strategy, aimed at attaining group solidarity, political advantage and/or countering 
existing pernicious claims by a dominant group or groups. I am thinking principally of 
African-America’s positive reclaiming of the term ‘black’ and the assertion of equality in 
the Black Power movement. Alongside this example, we might also point to the uneven 
but longstanding tradition of presenting positive images of collective Irishness to counter 
and overturn hegemonic representations running from Geoffrey Keating’s History of 
Ireland (15) through the various cultural and political movements of the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries; the Irish Race conventions in the USA from 1910 to 
1916; and the Gaelic Revival. There are additionally numerous examples of less obvious 
projects such as the British-born Chinese attempt to create a space for the development 
of solidarity that Parker and Song refer to as ‘reflexive racialisation’ (16), as well as the 
mundane exercises of cultural capital that are involved in bringing up children. Does 
teaching your African-American child blackness not also count as racialization (17), just 
as much as socializing a white child to associate people of color with danger, threat and 
low levels of social achievement? This end of the debate cannot be dealt with adequately 
here. Suffice to say that there is a strand of reflexive racialization which is not yet 
adequately theorized. 
When scholars have picked up racialization and run with it, it is primarily the first two of 
these three meanings that are foregrounded. One of the most enthusiastic historians 
currently deploying racialization is David Roediger, who, when asked to define the term 
in 2006, answered:   
 
‘I think the big advantage we have now in scholarship on race in the last several 
decades is that we get to start from the fact that it’s a biological fiction. So a term 
like racialization is just meant to say that race is not biological and is made in 
society. It describes the processes in which race is made, both by how groups of 
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workers are slotted into jobs economically and are brought to nations under 
certain economic circumstances, but also in the way that they’re treated in terms 
of citizenship rights by the state.’ 
 
He finally defines it as ‘that process through which the political economy and the state 
sort workers into different racial categories’. (18) Clearly, the role of the state and the 
labor process are central to this view, which corresponds largely to how it is used in 
‘racial state’ theory. 
There are two main points to make about racialization. Firstly, while Roediger’s (and 
Barrett’s) concept of ‘in-between people’ has provoked a certain amount of controversy, 
I have not yet read any work in that debate which questions the idea of racialization per 
se as a historical tool. (19) Indeed, among the arsenal of social science instruments, 
racialization seems to suggest itself as more readily translatable across disciplines (into 
historical studies) than many others. In any case, sociological analyses generated through 
this such as those of Miles, Armstrong, Barot and Bird, and Garner are necessarily 
heavily rooted in historical scholarship (20). 
 
The second point is that as far as I am concerned, the concept of racialization should not 
evacuate all other forms of identification and/or discrimination from the discursive field. 
Identifying a group as having been ‘racialized’ does not exhaust its meanings or suggest 
that class, gender, nation, etc. are not factors. It would be difficult to maintain that these 
processes are just about ‘race’: what can be argued instead is that they have specific racial 
outcomes. In 1905, the UK introduced its first piece of immigration legislation: the 
Aliens Act. This was directed at stemming the flow of East European Jews into Britain. 
However, the wording of the legislation’s final draft stipulated that immigration officials 
had the right to prevent disembarkation of passengers who had paid for steerage (the 
cheapest passage) and could not show proof of funds to support themselves once in the 
country. The real targets therefore were poorer East European Jews, excluding them on 
the basis of ‘race’, religion, and class, but not one of these identities alone. 
 
Having arrived at a working definition of racialization, and hopefully alluded to the 
complexities still to be dealt with in defining it fully (this is a work in progress), I shall 
now turn to the two specific periods in which the racialization of Irishness appears to me 
highly illustrative of the argument I want to put forward, namely that the history of 
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Ireland embodies the history of ‘race’ as well as any other country’s history. ‘Race’ did 
not only happen in Africa, the Americas or China (21). I also want to draw attention to 
the theme of productivity as key in the racialization of Irishness, and a topic that permits 
continuity between the sixteenth and twenty-first centuries. 
 
II The Irish Colonial Setting 
 
Property 
 
The early English colonization of Ireland took the form of expropriation of land by the 
Crown. This land was then rented to English settlers and Irish chiefs. The pattern of 
small semi-nomadic communal property-owning groups that had characterized Irish 
society was thus, by the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, profoundly altered. 
The labor of the Irish peasantry began to accumulate capital for the English landowners: 
they were transformed into tenant farmers and laborers tied to particular estates. The 
kind of employment relations thus approximate to what Charles Mills describes as ‘racial 
exploitation’. (22) While class exploitation is based principally on wages, Mills’ racialized 
subordinate population (R2) is either totally excluded from work, or recruited by 
members of the dominant group (R1) under conditions that differ from those of other 
workers. He asserts that in the colonial system, nonwhites are coerced to work, while 
white workers in the metropolis are compelled by the market to work. While this is true 
of the American colonies, in the Irish colonies, the workers, like the dominant group, are 
white. Moreover, the R2s (in this case Catholic Irish) are not part of the R1 group 
(English and Scots protestants) to which democratic norms apply. Indeed, Canny sees 
the 1570s as the moment when norms -in terms of the parameters of relations between 
colonizer and colonized- shift, so that by the end of the 1500s, it was acceptable to 
massacre civilians (23). Massacres in Munster and Ulster (carried out by forces led by 
Humphrey Gilbert in 1569, and the Earl of Essex in 1574 respectively), marked a point 
of no return. The pacification of the Ulster rebellion a generation later saw ‘scorched 
earth’ policies and the destruction of food sources as a deliberate strategy to create a 
famine.  
The rights and privileges of the Irish were reduced both individually (in terms of access 
to positions, voting rights and property inheritance) and corporately, as in the way that 
punishment for resistance was meted out to particular towns involved removing trade 
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privileges for example (24). After 1641, the re-conquest of Ireland resulted in a looser 
arrangement of quasi-privatized ownership that had been foreshadowed by the 
plantations of Munster, Ulster, Laois and Offaly in the late 1500s and early 1600s. The 
confiscated Catholic lands were redistributed among individual Protestant settlers rather 
than being held by the Crown – there was effectively no Crown to hold them until 1660. 
In the second section of his ‘racial exploitation’ thesis, Mills goes on to identify areas 
other than wages as arenas of exploitation, and the State as an actor in them (25). These 
are ‘not a matter of a single transaction’, he contends,  ‘but … a multiply interacting set 
with repercussions continually compounding and feeding back in a destructive way’ (26). 
This is the point at which we can discuss racialization as a process embracing the cultural 
which exceeds class exploitation. While the process of land appropriation can be likened to 
Enclosure, which also ended up creating landless tenant farmers and peasants in 
England, or the Highland clearances (a step along the spectrum toward the removal of 
Native Americans and Australians from their ancestral land), the justificatory discourse 
that both accompanied and enabled further exploitation lies at the heart of the 
racialization argument. So what is this to do with ‘race’?  
 
The Racialized Meaning of Property 
 
Racialization entails discursively attaching bodies to a fixed culture. The Irish, English 
and Scots distinguished each other by religion, class, language but not physical 
appearance. The legitimization of English rule had always been based on the perceived 
civilizational discrepancy between the English and the Irish. While no phenotypical 
difference is talked of in contemporary documentation, it overflows with cultural 
distinctions. These were made on a number of criteria including, prominently, property 
ownership and attachment to land. The apex of civilization according to the Protestant 
colonial administrators and commentators was urban-dwelling, English-speaking 
individual property owning constitutional monarchy. (27) The Gaelic Catholic Irish were 
represented as religiously backward, semi-nomadic rural, collective property-owning 
feudal and wild, savage people.  
Sir John Davies’ 'A Discovery of True Causes why Ireland was entirely subdued' (1612) 
illustrates the interwoven themes of Irishness as a wild, natural force that can be tamed 
and controlled only by exposure to Englishness. ‘The lands of the Irish in Ulster’, he 
maintains, ‘were the most rude and unreformed part of Ireland, and the centre of the last great rebellion. 
 7
They are now better organised and established, than any of the lands in the other provinces... 
The organisation of those lands happened with the special providence of God, who cast out those wicked 
and ungrateful traitors, the enemies of the Reformation in Ireland... 
His Majesty did not utterly exclude the natives out of this plantation ... but made a mixed plantation of 
British and Irish, that they might grow up together in one nation. The Irish were in some places 
transplanted from the woods and mountains into the plains and open countries, that being removed (like 
wild fruit trees) they might grow the milder, and bear the better and sweeter fruit. 
When this plantation hath taken root, and been fixed and settled but a few years, with the favour and 
blessing of God . . . it will secure the peace of Ireland, assure it to the Crown of England for ever; and 
finally, make it a civil and a rich, a mighty, and a flourishing Kingdom’. 
 
This post-Ulster rebellion reading of the ultimate failure of the Irish to militarily 
overcome the Crown forces shows continuity with sixteenth-century writings, which 
debated the extent to which the Irish were either redeemable or irredeemable. The 
important thing to observe is that we are dealing with essences that represent entire 
groups of people: the core element of any definition of racism. Indeed, in the view of 
most English commentators, the location of Irishness lay between barbarians and ‘Wild 
men’ (as illustrated in Spenser’s View). The former were irredeemable and uncivilizable, 
while the latter were recoverable by exposure to civilization. The mainstream Old 
English view, and indeed the thinking behind the Pale itself, was based on the latter. By 
obliging the wild Irish to follow English rather than Irish customs, they could be civilized 
then christianized. However, the converse of the cultural in-between state of the ‘wild 
man’ was that English colonists could, if they ‘went native’, degenerate into mere Irish.  
As an extension of the putative barbarity and wildness of the Irish people, the geography 
of Ireland was conceptualized as equally wild, alien and dangerous. This 
anthropomorphic device can be traced all the way back to Giraldus Cambrensis’ twelfth-
century Topography and History of Ireland, and runs through commentaries and writings on 
Ireland into the seventeenth century. 
All of this takes place within the vastly unequal power relationships of the colonial 
enterprise. The two things are not incidental: the civilizing mission was the official 
rationale for English involvement in Ireland, and turning the wild men into godly men 
was at its ideological core. The parameters of the acceptable means to do this altered at 
different moments. We must therefore be aware that the process of racialization is 
neither historically linear nor unchanging across time. While the 
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redeemable/irredeemable discussion is certainly central to the sixteenth and early 
seventeenth century, there is are two important changes of emphasis: one in the second 
half of the sixteenth century, as New English puritans arrive in Ireland, and another after 
the Rebellion.  
The New English never settled in the Pale before moving on elsewhere, and were intent 
on amassing land rather than converting souls. The long game of the Pale-based Old 
English, aimed at acculturation was thus dismissed by the land-obsessed new colonists. It 
is unsurprising that with such different priorities, religious bases and experiences of 
Ireland, the dominant ways of seeing and relating to the Gaelic Irish were to alter so 
abruptly.  
Similarly, in the wake of the 1641 rebellion, Pat Coughlan notes the establishment of ‘a 
fanatical quasi-compulsion to keep the Irish away as something foul, a contaminant to 
English being’. (28) This is spurred by fear of a repeat of the murders of colonists by the 
rebels, but is overlaid by the previous centuries’ alluvial accumulation of ideological 
material used to racialize the Irish. By the 1650s, even the most liberal lines of argument 
posited by English colonists, such as that of Vincent Gookin, she asserts, envisage the 
ultimate culturally cannibalistic ‘incorporation’ of the Irish into the English body (29). 
Language, customs, female property inheritance laws and dress codes are all singled out 
in the work of English commentators such as Campion, Smith, Moryson and Davies in 
Canny’s crucial period from 1569 to the 1610s. Yet it is not only the fact that Irish 
property-ownership is not uniformly individual, it is the lack of industry in the 
indigenous devoted to developing land that constitutes the problem. Indeed, this line of 
reasoning went as far as the deployment of the concept of res nullis, used to argue that 
Irish unproductivity authorized the takeover of land.  (30) Semi-nomadic transhumance 
farming was low enough on the scale of civilization to link the Gaelic Irish to the 
Scythians and Tartars (two benchmarks of barbarity in Renaissance Europe that shared 
such practices). The next rung up the ladder involved mineral extraction, and in Gerald 
Boate’s Ireland’s Naturall History (1652), their failure to accomplish this level of productive 
activity is evidence of what Coughlan summarizes as ‘pathological sloth’. A key notion in 
the Puritan lexicon is the necessity for industry: to turn time into output. Spenser’s 
Irenius in The View, argues Warley, ‘insists upon tillage as synonymous with civilization’. 
(31) Indeed, the observed continuing failure of the Irish to transform fallow soil into 
profitable working land fuels the post-1641 English backlash against Irishness. Meiksins 
Wood suggests that the objective of the colonists was to reproduce the land relations of 
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South-East England in the face of disorder (32). Indeed, she sees the link between 
improvement and settlement as crucial in the development of colonial relations: ‘The 
imperial legitimacy of the colonial power was rooted in the productive activities of its 
subjects, its ‘improving’ settlers’ (33). She goes on to note the blurring of the line 
between State and private interests in colonial productivity. 
Moreover, the line between Irish and American colonies is distinctly blurred, not only in 
terms of the personnel but the continuity of ideas about the merits of English and 
indigenous cultures. A number of writers have argued forcefully that the Irish experience 
was used as a learning opportunity for plantation and settler colonization of the New 
World. Comparing the Irish with Native Americans became part of the cultural economy 
of the early British colonial enterprise (34). 
 
I will leave the work of drawing a neat flow-chart elucidating the exact relationship 
between the material and the cultural contexts of the racialization of the Irish in Early 
Modern Ireland for another day. However, my argument is not that the material base 
determines the ideological superstructure, any more than Engels seems to think that it 
was his and Marx’s (35): there is a more complex interplay between them than this. My 
argument is, instead, that in the English colonization and re-conquest of Ireland, the 
cultural content of backwardness is projected onto the Catholic Gaelic Irish as a pretext 
for, and post-facto legitimization of, exploitation, transforming it into what Mills terms 
‘racial exploitation’. All the ideological and discursive functions of racism existed without 
the phenotypical element that would become constitutive in the late eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries: the ‘lesser race’ status of the Irish in Protestant English eyes 
legitimizes expropriation of land, and later, genocidal violence. The English colonization 
of Ireland thus witnessed racism without ‘race’, in the period prior to the founding of the 
American colonies (both on the American continent and in the Caribbean), which 
developed coevally with what is seen as the period when racism originated in America 
(36).  
 
III Contemporary setting 
 
There is plenty that a historian of ‘race’ could get his or her teeth into in the period 
between the Cromwellian re-conquest and the last decade or so of Irish history. My 
choice of the contemporary period is made in order to demonstrate that the country’s 
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experiences of racialization are, once again, illustrative of macro-level changes in the 
understandings of ‘race’ and functions of racialization. Since 1996, the Republic of 
Ireland has been transformed into a country of net immigration. Neo-liberal governance, 
very low corporation tax and an aggressive recruitment of FDI have made Ireland a 
magnet for multinational corporations (37). These have produced dramatic economic 
growth and drawn migrant workers from across the world. The State’s response shows 
the contemporary paradigm of the ‘racial State’, professing multiculturalism and official 
equality discourses while introducing new racialized shifts in the access to rights and 
resources. These changes have also thrown up two further twists in the story of ‘race’: 
the renovation of whiteness and its reconstruction of borders, and the return of the 
notion of non-productivity as an important vector of difference between mainstream and 
marginalized groups (both migrants and indigenous minorities). 
 
Among the variety of social phenomena to emerge in recent Irish history are those that 
locate it on the global map for the first time as a destination for both chain migration and 
sex trafficking, for example (38). The latest Census figures (2006) indicate that 14.68% of 
the Republic’s population is foreign born. (39) The vast majority of these (78%) are 
Europeans (many from the UK, and many from the former Eastern bloc). While the 
majority of immigrants are white, there are relatively small but growing communities 
from West Africa, Latin America and Asia. Some of these groups have been added to by 
people gaining refugee or associated status. 
The State’s response to the questioning of Irish identity that has been a direct corollary 
of this momentous social change for a country whose national vision of itself has been of 
a country of emigration, an ‘emigrant nursery’ (40), can be understood in two connected 
strands: the establishment of a pro-equality discourse, and the introduction of 
increasingly restrictive and exclusive legislation on immigration and citizenship.  
First a brief word on the political culture of the Republic of Ireland. It has been argued 
elsewhere (41) that Ireland has no organized far-right politics chiefly for historical 
reasons to do with the development of the State. The core parties (Fianna Fáil and Fine 
Gael) are populist, paternalist and nationalist, leaving only slim ideological margins both 
for the organized Left (very weak compared to European norms), and conversely, for the 
Far right. Only since 1997, when Fianna Fáil began to govern in coalition with the small 
but influential Progressive Democrats (committed to liberalization of trade), has Ireland 
moved toward being a neo-liberal regime (42). This is a notable change of tack that has 
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framed the response to migration. The other key factor apart from this is an ethnic and 
racial national identity forged in pre-independence and early state experience (i.e. of the 
1920s and 30s) (43). The precise political context is one of dominant neo-liberal, populist 
nationalism, which facilitates the transmission of the message that growth is good for 
everyone, regardless of the costs.  
The State’s response has at all times been the product of its relationship with the 
European Union. A directive on transposing equality legislation into national law 
prompted the State’s sponsorship of ‘interculturalism’ (a form of multiculturalism where 
the existence of unequal distribution of power is recognized as a starting point), through 
a body to monitor racism and introduce anti-racist initiatives, the National Consultative 
Committee on Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI). Following from the passage of the 
first of two main pieces of legislation on equality, in 1998 and 2000, the government also 
set up a monitoring body, the Equality Authority, to oversee the Acts’ implementation 
(44). The state’s official anti-racism, chiefly enacted through engagement via these two 
semi-state agencies, positions it within the European mainstream: all EU member-states 
must have equality legislation and sponsor initiatives aiming to tackle racism and other 
discriminatory practices.  
On the other hand, looking only at visa regimes and citizenship, the practices of the State 
show that racialization is ongoing. From a neo-liberal perspective, immigration is 
primarily about managing the relationship between supply and demand, and ensuring 
that it does not bring deleterious consequences, either through a mismatch of supply, or 
through illegal activities. The Irish visa regime, whilst being relatively flexible, aims at the 
German gastarbeiter model in that it seeks to keep the granting of residence and the right 
to work to a minimum period, and to enable the employer -rather than the employee- to 
control the visas. Already constrained by its membership of the EU to offer uncontrolled 
entry and settlement to the nationals of other member states, Ireland has attempted to 
control that migration stream over which it does have leverage, i.e. migration from 
outside the EU. Although presented as merely an administrative fait d’accompli, this 
situation is part of a Europe-wide racialization of immigration (45) in which the most 
important border in terms of entry, residence, access to work and social security is 
nationality, split into two identities; EU and non-EU (or ‘Third Country’) Nationals, 
which has been developing since the mid-80s. 
The main tool for controlling migration has been the capacity to alter the criteria for 
obtaining a work permit. Since 2003, the state employment agency, FAS, has been 
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assessing the changing needs of the market, and feeding back into policy by prioritizing 
and deprioritizing areas of work. From 2004, the Department of Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment has been instructing companies to recruit primarily from the so-called EU 
Accession states (46), i.e. those who became members of the EU in 2004, and only when 
this has proved unsuccessful can they search further afield. The options for reducing the 
numbers of migrants are concentrated therefore, on those non-EU nationals from the 
East, as well as those from other continents, disproportionately affecting developing 
world nationals. 
Moreover, this managerial and discriminatory set of practices has been brought to bear 
on Irish citizenship also in recent years. The Citizenship Act, 2005 amended the rules for 
becoming an Irish citizen. The story of the 2004 referendum and the issues it 
encompasses have been extensively dealt with elsewhere (47) so I will focus only on the 
most pertinent aspect: the shrinking of the civic qualification path vis-à-vis the ethnic 
one. Just as the visa regime sought to regulate the entry and conditions for residence and 
employment of non-EU nationals, the new Citizenship Act regulates the access to 
citizenship of children born in Ireland to non-EU parents. Prior to the 2005 Act, a child 
born on the island of Ireland was Irish by birth, through the jus soli route established at 
the foundation of the State, and enshrined in the 1937 Constitution. The amendment 
made in the Act set different criteria for children whose parents were non-nationals. The 
only nationals who would be interested in their child having Irish citizenship rather than 
their own are those from outside the EU (who obtain major benefits in terms of access 
to work through the ensuing long-term resident status). This is because according to pre-
2005 practice, the foreign parents of Irish children were granted discretionary leave to 
remain (under a Supreme Court ruling from 1989) in order to guarantee that the Irish 
citizen was afforded the right to enjoy family life. Those parents could then accrue 
enough residence in Ireland to enable them to apply for citizenship further down the 
line.  
In 2003, the incoming Minister for Justice, Michael McDowell challenged two such 
applications for residence in the Supreme Court and won the case. (48) After the 
referendum citizenship legislation was amended. A child born in Ireland to ‘non-national’ 
parents could not obtain Irish citizenship unless the parents had been living in the country 
for a minimum of three years. None of the other rules were altered. So, in practice, the 
right to Irish citizenship through birth no longer applied to all children, but only to those 
with an Irish parent, or whose non-Irish parents had lived there for three years (time 
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spent as an asylum-seeker was not counted). On the other hand, people who could 
establish one Irish grandparent, but who had never been to Ireland could still obtain 
citizenship through their bloodline. The distinction between jus soli (rights through 
birthplace) and jus sanguinis (rights through ancestry) was thus tilted toward the latter, 
making Irishness more reliant on an ethnic than a civic conception of membership.  
Minister McDowell states in his article in the Irish Times before the referendum that: ‘It 
(the amendment) won't be racist; and anyone who supports discrimination based on 
ethnic characteristics should vote against it because there's nothing in it for them’ (49). 
However stark the discriminatory outcomes of the new Citizenship Act, the State’s 
official anti-racism was inoculation against the charge. Yet this restriction solely impacts 
non-EU nationals, aimed at making it more difficult for them to access resources and 
rights. Indeed. Discourse in Ireland still veers between explicit racism and official anti-
racism, and when people talk about difference, the same resource-based anxieties are 
evinced as in the UK and North American literature. (50) 
 
Productivity in Contemporary Ireland 
 
The other area in which the historical themes have returned through the new 
configuration of globalized capital and labor is through the trope of productivity. The 
indigenous Irish nomadic minority, Travellers, have been in Ireland for centuries. They 
are ostensibly white, but racialized culturally as dirty, backward, lazy, thieving and above 
all, beyond the reach of the mainstream economy (i.e. non-productive members of the 
nation). Travellers fare poorly on all socio-economic indicators and have been the subject 
of state attempts to assimilate or eliminate them culturally since the 1960s (51). As land 
prices have skyrocketed in Ireland, tripling in the 1995-2005 period, the premium on the 
unused land at the margins of urban areas has also risen. These are places through which 
Travellers traditionally passed and settled, between town and country. However, once the 
ethos of work and productivity induced by the economic boom that was labeled the 
‘Celtic Tiger’ became the norm, the claims of Travellers to equality were undermined. 
The priority was for land to be made productive. So, like the semi-nomadic Gaelic Irish 
in the early modern period, Travellers were seen as a throwback, incapable of improving 
land, only of dirtying and disordering it, and keeping it out of production. This irony has 
not escaped Travellers. Activist Sinéad Ní Shuínéar (52) argues that the anti-Traveller 
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racism in contemporary Ireland is a continuity of the colonial view which revolves 
around hierarchical degrees of civilization.  
While Travellers are seen as competing for land (53), asylum-seekers, the other whipping 
boys of the ‘Celtic Tiger’, are perceived as competitors for work, space and social 
security. Similarly unproductive (because legally prohibited from taking paid work), and 
often from outside Europe, asylum-seekers saw themselves racialized, criminalized and 
blamed for urban decline, planning blight, sex trafficking, etc. The racialization of 
Travelers and asylum-seekers in contemporary Ireland is clearly what Etienne Balibar was 
talking about when he coined the term ‘crisis racism’ (54): the interesting point is, 
however, that Ireland’s economy was expanding, not contracting, and not in crisis. 
To conclude, the specificity of the racialization of Irishness in the 1990s and 2000s is due 
to the combination of a neo-liberal and nationalist administration that has been able to 
attract large amounts of foreign direct investment and manage a restrictive migration 
regime whose parameters are drawn from the overarching EU-level intergovernmental 
agreements on the basic criteria. The element that can actually be controlled by national 
governments is immigration from outside the EU, and this is where the ideological work 
has been carried out: in restricting access to the labor market for the mainly non-white 
nationals of the world outside the borders of the EU. At the same time, the trope of 
productivity, reconfigured in specific Irish conditions of hyper-mobile global capital and 
less mobile labor, now circulates in relation to Travellers and asylum-seekers -four and a 
half centuries after it was first significant in dividing populations hierarchically into 
groups in Ireland.  
 
Analysis 
 
The two points of Irish history that I have identified as being important in terms of the 
history of ‘race’ are separated by 400-450 years. I argue that they illustrate different 
chapters in the public discourse of ‘race’ in the West: first, an embryonic stage when 
there is racism without ‘race’, and second, the contemporary norm, in which there is 
‘racism without racists’. 
Discussions of the origin of racism range from naturalizing it, as in the stream of social 
psychology work on prejudice, beginning with Allport, to precise ideological and 
technical arguments about Enlightenment ideas irrevocably linking bodies to culture (55). 
The growth of racism has since been tied by scholars to the development of systems of 
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parallel, inter-dependent systems of free and un-free labor (the plantation mode of 
production). According to the former, all societies have ways of making distinctions 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’, in-groups and out-groups, and it is, within reason, necessary for 
survival: an excess of prejudice is the realm of the deviant individual. According to the 
latter, capitalism gave birth to racism as the system’s hierarchy in the phase of European 
expansion was legitimized by reference to ‘race’.  
My interpretation tips toward the ‘capitalism-begat-racism’ school, but stops short of it 
for the following reason. The case of Ireland demonstrates that the things that racism 
can do, such as control the movement of bodies, mark them as less human, and available 
for death, (56) can also be done by reference solely to cultural distinctions in a colonial 
context. The material framework is of theft of land and the associated system that turned 
Irish labor into English profit, with a landlord class accruing the financial advantages. 
This precedes Enlightenment texts that enshrine the idea of the body as key to culture 
within a hierarchical chain of being (57). It also predates to some extent the 
establishment of the American colonies, although not the Spanish conquest of what is 
now Latin America. In brief, if the period of expanding colonialism sees the origin of 
racism, then Ireland’s experience must lie at the early part of that. If the origin of racism 
in the Americas lies in the slave plantations and the period which ended with the 
categorical distinction between free and un-free labor corresponding to skin color (no 
white person could be a slave) (58), then the Irish experience predates it. 
The nineteenth century’s obsession with somatic differences and the construction of 
pseudo-scientific hierarchies based on particular differences has, I feel, distorted the 
discursive field and established body-centric racism as the norm. If however we see 
Ireland as the first place where racism is structurally constitutive of colonialism, then 
some recalibration of our tools for analysis is required. The bodies of the protagonists in 
the power relations of racism do not have to be so different in complexion, hair type, 
nose, eye and lip shape, or whatever minimal set of characteristics is accepted as being 
‘racial’. The English and Irish were indistinguishable physically, just as sedentary Irish, 
Travellers and Eastern European migrants are in twenty-first century Ireland. Yet the 
ideological labor of racialization works at the level of culture: it tags bodies as 
pathologically inclined to particular collective behaviors.  
In terms of the contemporary period, a number of lessons can be learned from the Irish 
case. In Europe, whiteness has internal and external borders. The racialization of white 
Europeans in each other’s countries is a centuries-old practice. The impact of 
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movements of global capital and membership of the EU is that countries that were once 
on the economic periphery of Europe are now part of its core: the periphery has moved 
East and South, beyond Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece. Those countries are 
all now countries of immigration. Their evolving economies are generating new forms of 
old discriminatory practices that run parallel to the frequent public assertions of 
commitment to equality which seek to undermine any interpretation of racism by critics 
as unfounded, except when applied to far-right parties (the ‘deviant individuals’). The 
‘tagging’ referred to above can mean the difference between life and death, as racist 
attacks continue against Travellers and European migrants in Ireland. (59) Indeed, the 
discourse is specifically not about ‘race’, but about culture and administrative 
responsibilities (the justifications for the citizenship amendments in the Republic), not to 
mention the imperative of productivity: from improved tillage in the sixteenth century to 
literally serving and catering to the ‘Celtic Tiger’s’ Irish consumers.  
So Ireland’s history, far from being de-racialized and exceptional, is actually exceptional 
in the opposite sense, in that it provides a more complex and nuanced way of 
understanding the evolution of ‘race’ through racialization. By understanding the 
experiences of Ireland, we avoid being sidetracked by color as the only possible locus of 
whatever ‘race’ means at a given time and place. The Irish experience might also make us 
wonder whether the nineteenth-century obsession with physical differences is the blip in 
the story of the racialization of the world’s population. I suggest that the continuity 
within that narrative is provided by a fetishization of culture and the embodiment of 
cultural difference, dating back to the English colonization of Ireland. 
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